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Is

NOT REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELINQUENT FILING OF ESTATE

TAX RETURN-United States v. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985).
Prior to 1985, the United States Courts of Appeals expressed conflicting views as to what constituted "reasonable
cause" for a failure to file an estate tax return in a timely manner.
While some circuit courts held that taxpayer reliance on an agent
hired to prepare and file an estate tax return was reasonable,'
other circuits placed the burden of filing such a return solely on
the executor of the estate.2 The United States Supreme Court
laid this conflict to rest in United States v. Boyle.' In a majority
opinion by ChiefJustice Burger,4 the Court held that a taxpayer's
reliance on an attorney did not excuse the taxpayer's failure to
make a timely filing of a Federal estate tax return.5
The Internal Revenue Code provides for a penalty in case of
a failure to file any tax return on or before the date prescribed by
the Code.6 A taxpayer can escape the statutory penalty7 by showI See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
687 (1985); Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979); Estate of
Bradley v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'g 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70
(1974).
2 Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983); Boeving v. United
States, 650 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1981); Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 456
F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972).
3 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985).
4 Although the Court's decision was unanimous,Justice Brennan,joined byJustices Marshall, Powell, and O'Connor, filed a concurring opinion. See id. at 694-95
(Brennan, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 693-94.
6 See I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1982). This section provides as follows:
In case of failure. . .to file any return. . .on the date prescribed therefor (determined with regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it
is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to
willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown
as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is
for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues,
not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate[.]
Id. A return filed three months and one day after the deadline would therefore
incur a penalty of 20% of the amount shown as tax. See Rohrabaugh v. United
States, 611 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1 (f), T.D.
7133, 1971-2 C.B. 415, 418 (giving examples of penalties assessed for various delinquent filings).
The Code also provides for a minimum penalty of the lesser of $100 or 100%
of the amount shown as tax if the return is filed more than 60 days after the due
date. I.R.C. § 6651(a) (1982).
7 Although § 6651 (a) of the Code is entitled "Addition to the tax," courts have
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ing that the failure to file the return on time was "due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." 8 Although
"reasonable cause" is not clearly defined by the Code,9 the relevant Treasury Regulation provides that the taxpayer must make a
satisfactory demonstration that he employed "ordinary business
care and prudence" in order to establish "reasonable cause."'"
The meaning of "reasonable cause" in the context of reliance on
a professional agent was the central issue in United States v.
Boyle. 1'
The Boyle case had its genesis when Myra Boyle died on September 14, 1978.12 Pursuant to Myra Boyle's will, her son, Robert W. Boyle, was named executor of her estate.'" Boyle hired
Ronald Keyser to act as attorney for his mother's estate and process the legal paperwork necessary to settle the estate. 14 The fact
that Boyle had no expertise in the area of Federal estate taxation
was undisputed;' 5 Boyle relied solely on Keyser's skill and
experience.
Keyser subsequently informed Boyle that the estate was required to submit a Federal estate tax return.17 Keyser failed to
advise Boyle, however, that the deadline for filing the return was
nine months after his mother's death.' 8 Although Boyle contacted Keyser several times during the summer of 1979, Keyser
never indicated to Boyle that the estate tax return was past due.' 9
Eventually, Keyser discovered that a clerical error had resulted in
recognized that the addition is actually a penalty. See, e.g., Rohrabaugh v. United
States, 611 F.2d 211, 218 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 690 (using the
term "penalty").
8 I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1982).
9 Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 690 (recognizing that Code defines neither "reasonable
cause" nor "willful neglect").
1o Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1), T.D. 7133, 1971-2 C.B. 415, 417.
I 1 See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 691.
12 Id. at 689.
13
14

Id.
See id.

15 Id. Boyle had been executor of his father's estate approximately 20 years ear-

lier. Id. There was no evidence that Boyle had filed a Federal estate tax return at
that time, however. Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1252 n.2 (7th Cir.
1983), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 687 (1985).
16 Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 689. Boyle's involvement was limited to supplying Keyser
with all pertinent information and records concerning his mother's estate. See id.
17 Id.
18 Id. The Internal Revenue Code provides that returns relating to estate taxes
"shall be filed within 9 months after the date of the decedent's death." I.R.C.
§ 6075(a) (1982). Accordingly, Myra Boyle's estate tax return was due on June 14,
1979-nine months after her death. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 689.
I Id. Furthermore, Judge Campbell's opinion for the Seventh Circuit Court of
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the omission of the filing date from his master calendar.2 °
Boyle first learned that the return was past due on September 6, 1979.21 Keyser quickly arranged a meeting with Boyle, and
the return was filed on September 13, 1979.2 As a result of the
late filing, the Internal Revenue Service imposed a penalty on the
estate of Myra Boyle. 23 Robert Boyle paid the fine and filed suit
for a refund in the United States District Court for the Central
District of Illinois.24 Boyle asserted that the statutory penalty was
unwarranted because his reliance on Keyser's expertise constituted reasonable cause for his failure to file the return on time.25
The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in
favor of Boyle.26
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.27
The circuit court held that Boyle had exercised the "ordinary
business care and prudence" necessary to establish reasonable
cause. 28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 29 in order to resolve the existing conflict among the circuits.3 The Court reversed and held that reliance on an agent to prepare and file a
Federal estate tax return did not excuse the taxpayer's delin3
quent filing. '

Although section 6651 of the Internal Revenue Code has undergone numerous technical changes in the past seventy years,
the relevant language of the statute has remained substantially
unchanged. Originally, the Revised Statutes of 1878 contained
Appeals indicated that Boyle failed to inquire about the deadline. Boyle v. United
States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985).
20 Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 689.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. The penalty assessed was $17,124.45. Id. This amount represented 15% of
the total estate tax due. See supra note 6 (explaining computation of late filing
penalties).
24 See Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1251 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 687 (1985).
25 Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 689-90.
26 Id. at 690. The district court held that the Boyle case was controlled by the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Rohrabaugh v. United States. Id. at 690 (citing
Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979)); see infra notes 71-78
and accompanying text (discussion of Rohrabaugh case).
27 Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 687
(1985).
28 Id. at 1253.
29) United States v. Boyle, 466 U.S. 903 (1984).
30 Bovle, 105 S. Ct. at 688-89; see also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (noting conflict among circuits in this area of law).
3' Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693-94.
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section 3176, which provided for a fifty per cent penalty if the
taxpayer failed to file a timely return. 32 The Revenue Act of
191633 added language to section 3176 that excused a late filing
if it was supported by "reasonable cause." 34 The Revenue Act of
1928"5 renumbered section 3176 as section 291.6 Although the
bulk of the language remained unchanged, section 291 provided
for a twenty-five per cent penalty for late filing rather than the
previous fifty per cent penalty. 7 Amendments in 1936 further reduced the penalty to five per cent for each month the tax return
remained unfiled. 8 Section 291 was eventually recodified in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as section 6651.
The cases that have decided whether reliance on an agent
establishes "reasonable cause" for the late filing of a tax return
can be divided into three categories. 4° The first category is composed of cases in which the taxpayer relied on the erroneous
"legal advice" of a professional agent. 4 ' The second category includes cases in which courts imposed upon the taxpayer a "personal, nondelegable duty" to ensure that the return was filed
32 See 35 U.S. REV. STAT. ch. 2, § 3176 (2d ed. 1878) (current version at 26
U.S.C. § 6651 (1982)). Section 3176 provided that "in case of a refusal or neglect. . .to make a list or return. . .[the tax collector] shall add fifty per centum to
such tax." Id.
33 Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
34 Id. § 3176, 39 Stat. at 775. This section provided as follows:
In case of any failure to make and file a return or list within the time
prescribed by law or by the collector, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall add to the tax fifty per centum of its amount except that,
when a return is voluntarily and without notice from the collector filed
after such time and it is shown that the failure to file it was due to a
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, no such addition shall be made to
the tax.
Id. (emphasis added).
35 Ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
36 Compare id. § 291, 45 Stat. at 857 with Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 3176,
39 Stat. 756, 775 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (1982)).
37 See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 291, 45 Stat. 791, 857 (current version at
26 U.S.C. § 6651 (1982)).
38 Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 291, 49 Stat. 1648, 1727 (current version at
26 U.S.C. § 6651 (1982)).
39 See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 68, 68A Stat. 1, 821 (current version
at 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (1982)).
40 See Boyle, 105 S.Ct. at 691 n.5, 693 & n.9; see also infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (explaining the three categories of cases).
41 See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. American Ass'n of Eng'rs Employment, 204 F.2d
19, 21 (7th Cir. 1953); Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558,
560 (5th Cir. 1952); Gemological Inst. of Am. v. Riddell, 149 F. Supp. 128, 132
(S.D. Cal. 1957).
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within the time prescribed by law.42 Finally, the third category
consists of cases in which the taxpayer relied on a professional's
advice concerning a tax return's due date.43
Many of the early decisions interpreting "reasonable cause"
in the context of reliance on professional advice fit into the first
category-the "legal advice" cases.44 The "legal advice" cases
are those in which the taxpayer requested professional advice regarding his duty to file a particular return 45 or regarding his lia-

bility under a particular statute. 46 The first case to decide
whether reliance on professional advice constituted reasonable
cause for the untimely filing of a return-DaytonBronze Bearing Co.
v. Gilligan4 7-was a "legal advice" case.

In Dayton, the Collector of Internal Revenue contended that
the taxpayer was subject to the munition manufacturer's tax of
1916.48 The taxpayer, Dayton Bronze Bearing Company, filed its
return under this Act approximately four months after the due
date. 49 The taxpayer maintained that its reliance on the advice of
counsel established reasonable cause for the untimely filing, 50
and the Sixth Circuit agreed. 5 ' The court held that reliance on an
attorney's advice excused the taxpayer from the statutory pen42 See, e.g., Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65, 66 (8th Cir. 1981);
Millette & Assocs. v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121, 124-25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 899 (1979); Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 854 (5th
Cir. 1966); Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1957); Daley v.
United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.D. 1979).
43 See, e.g., Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 955 (1985); Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174,
178 (3d Cir. 1978); Sarto v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 476, 478 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
44 See, e.g., Orient Inv. & Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601, 603 (D.C. Cir.
1948); Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1947); Girard
Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 843, 848 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
699 (1942).
45 See Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir. 1947) (taxpayer asked accountant to determine whether it was required to file personal holding company returns).
46 See Dayton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 281 F. 709, 712 (6th Cir. 1922)
(taxpayer asked its attorney to determine whether it was subject to munition manufacturer's tax).
47 281 F. 709 (6th Cir. 1922).
48 See id. at 710; see also Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 780 (Munition Manufacturer's Tax Act).
4,) See Dayton, 281 F. at 712. The return was due on March 1, 1917, but the
taxpayer filed the return on July 13, 1917. Id.
50 Id. Dayton Bronze Bearing Company offered evidence establishing that reputable counsel had advised the company that it was not responsible for the payment
of the tax in question. Id.
51 See id. at 712-13.
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alty. 52 The court reasoned that reliance on the legal advice of
counsel evidenced the taxpayer's good faith and established that
the taxpayer had made an honest attempt to determine whether
it was subject to the tax in question.5 3
The Second Circuit espoused this "legal advice" principle in
Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner.54 The taxpayer corporation in Haywood disclosed all the necessary information to its
accountant and requested the preparation of any required tax returns. 5 5 The accountant, however, failed to prepare and file personal holding company returns.5 6 As a result, the Commissioner
imposed upon the taxpayer the statutory penalty for failure to file
a tax return. 57 The taxpayer objected, claiming that reliance on
its accountant demonstrated the "ordinary business care and
prudence" necessary to establish reasonable cause.58 The Second
Circuit held for the taxpayer and stated that the taxpayer should
not be penalized for relying on an experienced professional.5 9
The court reasoned that an ordinary person should not be held
to the high standard expected of an expert.60 Consequently, the
court concluded that reliance on professional advice established
52 Id. at 713. The court explained that Dayton's mistaken reliance on its attorney's advice was "sufficient to constitute a reasonable cause for failure to make and
file a return within the time prescribed by law." Id.
53 Id. The court maintained that reliance on legal advice tended "to show that
the taxpayer. . .act[ed] in good faith and availed itself of the best means at its command to determine, honestly and fairly, the question of its liability." Id. at 712-13.
54 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950).
55 Id. at 770. The taxpayer's secretary-treasurer testified that he advised the taxpayer's accountant to prepare any returns required by recent changes in the law. Id.
at 771 n.2.
56 Id. at 770-71.
57 Id. at 770. The tax court upheld the Commissioner's imposition of the statutory penalty. See id.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 771. The court repudiated the rationale of its earlier decision in Berlin
v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 642 (1932). See Haywood, 178 F.2d at 771. In Berlin, the taxpayer entrusted preparation of his Federal
income tax return to his accountant. Berlin, 59 F.2d at 996. The accountant obtained an extension of the filing deadline upon condition that he file an estimated
return prior to the original deadline. Id. The accountant, however, failed to make a
bona fide attempt to file the estimated return. Id. at 997. The court ruled that the
Commissioner correctly assessed a penalty against the taxpayer. Id. The court reasoned that the taxpayer was "chargeable with any 'willful neglect' ascribable to his
agent." Id. (citations omitted).
60 Haywood, 178 F.2d at 771. The court reasoned that penalizing the taxpayer for
his consultant's errors would hold the taxpayer "to a standard of care which is not
his own and one which, in most cases, would be far higher than that exacted of a
layman." Id.
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reasonable cause for the failure to file a tax return.6 '
The "legal advice" principle was extended by the Sixth Circuit in In re Fisk's Estate.6 2 Fisk's Estate did not involve a request for
legal advice; the taxpayer in that case merely delegated the filing
of an estate tax return to an attorney. 6 3 The attorney subsequently failed to file the return in a timely manner. 6' The court
61 See id. at 772. The court stated: "When a corporate taxpayer selects a competent tax expert, supplies him with all necessary information, and requests him to
prepare proper tax returns, we think the taxpayer has done all that ordinary business care and prudence can reasonably demand." Id. at 771.
The Supreme Court first dealt with the "reasonable cause" language in Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219 (1944). The facts of Lane-Wells were similar to those of Haywood. Compare id. at 220 (reliance on professional resulted in
failure to file personal holding company return) with Haywood, 178 F.2d at 770-71
(same). The taxpayer in Lane-Wells was advised that it was not classified as a personal holding company. Lane-Wells, 321 U.S. at 220. Consequently, the taxpayer
failed to submit a personal holding company return. Id. The Court stated that the
question of reasonable cause was one of fact and thus remanded the case to the tax
court for a determination of whether reliance on professional advice constituted
reasonable cause for the failure to file a tax return. Id. at 225.
A majority of the Federal courts have agreed with the statement of the law
contained in Haywood. For example, in Girard Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d
843 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 699 (1942), an accountant advised the
taxpayer that it was not a personal holding company and that a personal holding
company tax return was unnecessary. See id. at 847. Consequently, the taxpayer
filed the required tax return approximately two years after it was due. Id. The
court stated: " 'If the taxpayer consulted a lawyer or accountant and upon the presentation of the full information in his possession was advised that no return was
necessary, a sufficient showing of 'reasonable cause' for the delinquency has been
made.' " Id. at 848 (citation omitted). The court remanded the case for additional
fact-finding with respect to the issue of full disclosure. See id.
The case of Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947),
presented similar facts. In Hatfried, the court noted that the taxpayer disclosed all
relevant facts and circumstances to its accountant. Id. at 632. The taxpayer then
relied on the accountant's determination that a personal holding company return
was unnecessary. See id. The Commissioner ultimately determined that a personal
holding company return was necessary and attempted to impose a penalty on the
taxpayer because of its failure to file. See id. at 629. The court held that the taxpayer's reliance on its accountant's advice constituted the "ordinary business care
and prudence" necessary to establish reasonable cause for the untimely filing. Id.
at 635; accord Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558 (5th Cir.
1952); Orient Inv. & Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948); see
also Commissioner v. American Ass'n of Eng'rs Employment, 204 F.2d 19 (7th Cir.
1953) (taxpayer established reasonable cause for failure to file Federal income tax
returns when it demonstrated reliance on advice of tax counsel that it was exempt
from Federal income tax); Gemological Inst. of Am. v. Riddell, 149 F. Supp. 128
(S.D. Cal. 1957) (taxpayer showed reasonable cause for untimely filings of Federal
income tax returns when it demonstrated reliance on advice of counsel that it was
exempt from tax because of status as nonprofit corporation).
62 203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953).
63 Id. at 359.
64 Id. The attorney for the estate actually mailed the return on the due date. Id.

1986]

NOTES

157

held, however, that the taxpayer had demonstrated reasonable
cause for the untimely filing.65 In the course of its opinion, the
court made it clear that it was extending the "legal advice" principle.6 6 The court relied squarely on Haywood and held that permissible reliance on a professional tax consultant included
reliance on the professional for the timely filing of a return.6 7
Accordingly, the court concluded that reasonable cause for late
filing was established when the taxpayer relied on an agent to
prepare and file an estate tax return, as well as when he relied on
the agent's advice that no return was necessary. 68 The court reasoned that an ordinary taxpayer should not be penalized for the
unprofessional conduct of his attorney. 69 The circuit court further maintained that imposition of a penalty in these circumstances would hold the taxpayer to the high standard of an
expert.70
The Seventh Circuit adopted the rationale of Fisk's Estate in
Rohrabaugh v. United States.7 ' The taxpayer in Rohrabaugh relied
exclusively on her lawyer to prepare and file an estate tax return. 72 The return was filed late because of an oversight by the
attorney. 73 The Rohrabaugh court recognized that there was a facAs a result, the return reached the revenue collector's office one day late. Id. The
Commissioner subsequently attempted to impose a 5% penalty on the taxpayer.
Id; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining method of calculating
5% penalty). The Internal Revenue Code now provides that a return mailed on the
due date is filed in a timely manner. See I.R.C. § 7502(a)(1) (1982).
65 Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d at 360.
66
67

See id.

Id. The court stated: "We adhere to the rule stated in Haywood Lumber &
that as a matter of law reasonable cause was shown in this case.
Mining Co ....
This rule, we hold, applies to the filing of tax returns as well as to reliance upon
technical advice in complicated legal matters." Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 359.
70 Id. The Fisk's Estate court explained:
To impute to the taxpayer the mistakes of his consultant would be to
penalize him for consulting an expert; for if he must take the benefit of
his counsel's or accountant's advice cum onere, then he must be held to a
standard of care which is not his own and one which, in most cases,
would be far higher than that exacted of a layman.
Id. (quoting Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771).
71 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979).
72 Id. at 212. The court stated that the "[tiaxpayer had no previous experience
as a personal representative of an estate and relied completely on her attorney to
prepare. . . and properly file. . . the return in question." Id. The court also noted
that the taxpayer disclosed all relevant facts to the estate's attorney and maintained
close contact with him. Id. The attorney failed to inform the taxpayer of the estate
tax return's due date, however. Id.
73 Id. at 213.
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tual distinction between the "legal advice" cases and those cases
in which the taxpayer merely delegated the preparation and filing
of a tax return to an agent. 4 The court chose to follow Fisk's
Estate, however,7 5 and held that a taxpayer could rely on an attorney to prepare and file a Federal estate tax return.7 6 The court
reasoned that Congress did not intend "to penalize . . . inno77
cent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care."
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that delegation of the task
of preparing a Federal estate tax return to an experienced attorney was an exercise of reasonable care.7 8
In sharp contrast to the Rohrabaugh case was the Seventh Cir74 Id. at 217. The court noted that several cases made a distinction between
"reliance upon technical advice such as the legal duty to file a return" and reliance
upon an attorney or accountant to prepare and file a return. Id. The court expressed dissatisfaction with this distinction, especially in the case of a complex Federal estate tax return. Id.; see also Gray v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 1356, 1358
(W.D. Mo. 1978) (noting the "distinction between reliance on an attorney for legal
advice regarding whether a return must be filed and reliance on him to insure that a
return is actually filed"). The Gray court maintained that this distinction was valid
only when the taxpayer had actual knowledge of the tax return's due date. Id. at
1361. The court reasoned that a refusal to allow taxpayer reliance on an attorney
to file the return would force the taxpayer to research the tax code and ascertain
the correct due date. Id. Consequently, the court held that the rationale of the
"legal advice" cases also applied to cases of reliance on an attorney to prepare and
file a tax return. See id.
75 Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 214-15 (citing Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d at 360); see also
supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing rationale of Fisk's Estate).
76 See Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 215. The Rohrabaugh court adopted the standard
applied by the court in Giesen v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1973),
which included the following requirements: (1) the taxpayer must be unfamiliar
with tax law; (2) the taxpayer must make full disclosure of all pertinent facts to an
attorney or an accountant; and (3) the taxpayer must employ ordinary business care
and prudence in the selection of a competent tax expert. See Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d
at 215 (citing Giesen, 369 F. Supp. at 35-36).
77 Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 214 (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,
496 (1943)); see also United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (Congress
did not intend to penalize a person who failed to pay tax because of "a bona fide
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as
to the adequacy of the records he maintained.").
78 See Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 215. The court also noted that its "opinion will be
of no help to a taxpayer whose delinquency is intentional." Id. at 219. Intentional
delinquency is equivalent to willful neglect for the purposes of § 6651 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Janice Leather Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 391
F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corporation "willfully neglected" to file
withholding tax returns when its bookkeeper failed to file the returns in order to
conceal her embezzlement).
Judge Swygert dissented in Rohrabaugh. He expressed concern that the court
had "immunized a negligent attorney from. . .an open and shut malpractice suit."
Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 220 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
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cuit's decision in United States v. Kroll.79 In Kroll, the court held
that the executor had a "personal, nondelegable duty" to ensure
that an estate tax return was filed when due. 80 The court recognized that if a question of tax law had been involved, the executor
would have been entitled to rely on an attorney.8 ' Nevertheless,
the court refused to allow the executor to rely on an attorney for
the preparation and filing of a tax return.8 2 The opinion stated
that a person with even the slightest degree of business experience knows that a deadline exists for the filing of a tax return.83
Therefore, the court concluded that the executor must bear the
burden of ascertaining and meeting the statutory filing deadline
for a Federal estate tax return.8 4
Kroll is an example of the "personal, nondelegable duty" line
79 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977). The facts of Kroll were relatively simple. See id.
at 394-95. An executor with a significant amount of business knowledge retained
an experienced attorney to prepare and file an estate tax return. Id. The attorney
filed the return one year and two weeks after the due date. See id. at 395.
80 Id. at 396.

81 Id. at 395, 396. The court stated that "[i]nsofar as any question of tax law,
complicated or otherwise, might have been involved, there is little doubt that Kroll
would have been entitled to entrust these problems to an attorney for resolution."
Id. at 395.
82 Id. at 397. The court refused to "sanction an abdication of responsibility for
the timely filing of a return admittedly due." Id.
83 Id. at 396.

84 See id. at 396-97. The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Fleming
v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981). In Fleming, the taxpayer was the
personal representative of his father's estate. Id. at 1123. The taxpayer enlisted his
cousin to serve as the lawyer for the estate, and his cousin advised him of the estate
tax return's due date. Id. The attorney further informed the taxpayer that he had
obtained a 12 month extension of the filing deadline. Id. at 1123-24. In fact, however, the attorney failed to apply for the extension. Id. at 1124. Consequently, the
return was filed 10 months late. Id.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Commissioner's imposition of the statutory
penalty. Id. The court relied on the fact that the taxpayer knew the original due
date of the return and stated that the taxpayer's reliance on his attorney after that
date was not an exercise of reasonable care. See id. at 1125-26. The majority dismissed the taxpayer's argument that he was misled by his attorney's representation
that an extension had been obtained. Id. at 1126-27. The court stated that "[t]he
taxpayer had a personal non-delegable duty to file the return on time and this duty
extended to and encompassed the proper and timely filing of an application for an
extension." Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Cudahy noted that the taxpayer relied on his
attorney's assertion that an extension of the filing deadline had been obtained. Id.
at 1128 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).Judge Cudahy maintained that this constituted reasonable reliance on legal advice. Id. He concluded that the taxpayer should not be
penalized for his failure to "challenge the attorney and read the Internal Revenue
Code provisions and regulations himself." Id.; cf. Commissioner v. American Ass'n
of Eng'rs Employment, 204 F.2d 19, 21 (7th Cir. 1953) (holding taxpayer "should
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of cases.8 5 In these cases, the taxpayer is charged with the sole
responsibility of filing the tax return on time.8 6 Consultation with
a professional adviser does not change this duty. 7 The facts of
the "personal, nondelegable duty" cases are usually similar to
those of Rohrabaugh or Fisk's Estate.s8 The results, however, are
quite different. When the "personal, nondelegable duty" rationale is applied, the taxpayer is often held liable for the statutory
penalty.8 9 According to these cases, reliance on a professional adviser to prepare and file a tax return does not constitute reasonable cause for a failure to file the return on time.9 0
One of the first cases to apply the "personal, nondelegable
duty" rationale was Ferrando v. United States.9 l In Ferrando, the
Ninth Circuit held that the regularly appointed executor could
not escape his statutorily imposed duties of "vigilance and
not be penalized for an error made by its expert tax counsel in deciding a close
question of law").
In the Boyle case, a different panel of the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the
personal, nondelegable duty rationale:
[I]t is very easy for judges to speak of non-delegable duties and to impose on laymen standards of 'reasonable care' for handling their legal
affairs. Judges have, of course, extensive education and experience in
the law. Ordinary laymen... view most legal proceedings as somewhat
imposing and mysterious. It is, therefore, not surprising that they
should rely on their attorneys to handle their legal affairs. We should be
hesitant to find such reliance unreasonable....
Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1254 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 687

(1985).

85 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (examples of "personal, nondelegable duty" cases).
86 See, e.g., Boeving v. United States, 650 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1981); Fleming
v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1981); Daley v. United States, 480 F.
Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.D. 1979); Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
200, 206 (1967), a]d, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969).
87 See supra note 86 (examples of cases holding taxpayer liable for delinquent
filings regardless of reliance on professional adviser).
88 See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Rohrabaugh and
Fisk's Estate cases).
89 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying "personal, nondelegable duty" rationale and imposing penalty on taxpayer); United
States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 424 (1973) (same), aff'd, 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975). But see Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251 (7th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting "personal, nondelegable duty" rationale and finding reasonable cause for an untimely filing), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985); Gray v. United
States, 453 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (same).
90 See supra note 86.
91 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957). In Ferrando, an attorney failed to file two separate estate tax returns in a timely manner. Id. at 584, 586. Both executors attempted to avoid the statutory penalty by demonstrating reliance on the attorney.
See id. at 584-86.
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promptness" by delegating the details of estate administration to
an attorney.92 The court maintained that the duty of filing an estate tax return within the time prescribed could not be delegated;
it was a personal duty.93 The court opined that even an uneducated layman was aware that a tax return carried with it a filing
deadline.94 According to the court, this awareness prevented the
executor from delegating his personal duty to make a timely
filing.95
Falling somewhere between the "personal, nondelegable
duty" cases and the "legal advice" cases are those cases in which
the taxpayer requested a professional's advice regarding a tax return's due date-the "due date" cases.9 6 These cases do not in92 Id. at 586. The court stated that "mere reliance upon an attorney to handle
the technical details of the administration of an estate does not excuse the regularly
appointed executors for. . .inattention regarding simple and fundamental matters." Id.; accord Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 (1967), aff'd,
410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969). In Duttenhofer, the tax court noted that "petitioners
cannot avoid the penalty for delinquent filing simply because they hired a lawyer,
and turned everything over to him." Id. at 206.
93 Ferrando, 245 F.2d at 586. The court opined that "this duty of vigilance and
promptness is not a delegable one, so far as an executor is concerned. It is personal." Id.; see also Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 424, 425
(1973) (executor has positive duty to ensure that estate tax return is filed; delegation to attorney does not discharge duty), afd, 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
The Eighth Circuit has accepted the "personal, nondelegable duty" rationale
and has consistently applied it in cases involving delinquent Federal estate tax returns. See Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 955 (1985); Crouse v. United States, 711 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1983);
Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983); Boeving v. United States, 650
F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1981); Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir.
1981) (all applying "personal, nondelegable duty" rationale and imposing penalty
on taxpayer).
94 Ferrando, 245 F.2d at 586; see also Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 813
(D.N.D. 1979) ("ascertainment of the required filing date is not beyond the expertise of a lay person").
95 See Ferrando, 245 F.2d at 586. Several other courts have applied the "personal, nondelegable duty" rationale in cases that did not involve Federal estate tax
returns. See, e.g.,
Millette & Assocs. v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.) (taxpayer responsible for timely filing of Federal income tax return), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 899 (1979); Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1966)
(same); Coates v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1956) (taxpayer responsible for timely filing of declaration of estimated tax); Southeastern Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1946) (taxpayer failed to establish reasonable
cause for untimely filing by demonstrating that it relied on accountant to file personal holding company returns in timely manner).
96 See, e.g., Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 955 (1985); Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174 (3d
Cir. 1978); Sarto v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The Sarto
court recognized that a case in which the taxpayer asked his attorney when the
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volve technical advice given by a professional; the professional
merely advises the taxpayer of the return's due date.9 v In these
situations, however, taxpayer inquiry regarding the tax return's
due date negates the inference of a complete delegation and dereliction of the taxpayer's personal duty. 98
Sarto v. United States99 presents a typical "due date" scenario.
In Sarto, the executor of an estate asked his attorney to determine
the estate tax return's filing deadline.' 0 0 The attorney mistakenly
assured the executor that an indefinite extension of the time for
filing had been obtained.'' As a result, the estate tax return was
filed late.' 0 2 Despite the erroneous representation by the attorney, the court held that the executor failed to demonstrate reasonable cause for the untimely filing.' 0 3 The court reasoned that
the purpose of section 6651 of the Internal Revenue Code was to
return was due fell between the two extremes-the "legal advice" cases and the
"personal, nondelegable duty" cases. See Sarto, 563 F. Supp. at 478.
97 See, e.g., Sarto v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 476, 478 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Estate
of DiPalma v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 324, 325-26 (1978); Estate of Bradley v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70, 72 (1974), affd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975).
98 At least one court has indicated that inquiry into the tax return's due date
satisfies the taxpayer's duty to ensure that the return is filed in a timely manner. See
Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70, 72 (1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d
527 (6th Cir. 1975). In Bradley, the tax court stated: "We think [the taxpayer's]
inquiry and his reliance on the accountant's response. . .were consistent with the
Id.
ordinary business care and prudence standard.
99 563 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
100 Id. at 478.
lO Id. The court stated that the plaintiffs "asked the estate's attorney when the
estate's tax return was due, thus satisfying their duty to inquire, and were then
affirmatively misled by their attorney into believing that an indefinite extension had
been granted the estate." Id.
102 See id. at 477.
103 Id. at 478. The court found "that the circumstances of this case still do not
justify departure from the general rule that reliance on an attorney is not 'reasonable cause' for late filing." Id.; accord Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d
454, 456 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 955 (1985).
In a case that was similar to Sarto, the tax court reached a contrary conclusion.
See Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974), afd, 511 F.2d
527 (6th Cir. 1975). In Bradley, an accountant incorrectly advised the executor of an
estate that the estate's tax return was due 18 months after the decedent's death. Id.
at 70. As a result, the executor filed the return approximately 30 days late. See id.
The tax court held that the executor's reliance on the accountant's erroneous representation constituted reasonable cause for the untimely filing. Id. at 73. The
court reasoned that the executor did not delegate his personal duties; rather, by
inquiring into the return's due date, he made an affirmative effort "to ascertain and
discharge his responsibilities." Id. The court noted the close analogy to the "legal
advice" cases:
To sustain [the Commissioner's] argument would require a holding that
an executor may rely upon the advice of an expert on substantive tax law
questions but. . . may not do so with respect to. . . the due date of tax
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safeguard the Government's revenue.° 4 Consequently, the court
concluded that the taxpayer should seek recovery of the penalty
from his attorney rather than from the Federal Government. 105
The United States Supreme Court was aware of the three
existing rationales for cases involving the late filing of tax returns 0 6 when it decided United States v. Boyle." °7 Consequently,
the Court attempted to clarify the definition of "reasonable
cause" in the context of reliance on an agent for the preparation
and filing of a tax return.10 8 In the Boyle decision, the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer who employed an attorney to prepare
and file a Federal estate tax return failed to establish reasonable
cause for an untimely filing.' 0 9
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger first asserted
that the purpose of the penalty imposed by section 6651 of the
Internal Revenue Code was to ensure that a taxpayer's liability to
the Government would be calculated and paid promptly and efficiently." 0 The Chief Justice then recognized that the United
States Courts of Appeals had differed in their treatment of the
returns-that he must research that question for himself. We decline to
so hold.
Id.; see also Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy,
J., dissenting) (taxpayer should not be required to "challenge the attorney and read
the Internal Revenue Code provisions and regulations himself"); Estate of DiPalma
v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 324, 327 (1978) (taxpayer justified in relying on attorney
after she satisfied her duty to inquire).
104 See Sarto, 563 F. Supp. at 478; see also Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497
(1943) (sanctions under revenue laws are "calculated to induce prompt and forthright fulfillment of every duty under the income tax law").
105 Sarto, 563 F. Supp. at 478. The court stated: "When a tax return has been
filed late because of attorney neglect, the taxpayer may... recover the amount of
any penalty imposed upon him from his attorney in a subsequent malpractice action." Id.; accord Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1258 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 687 (1985); Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d
1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1981) (SwygertJ., concurring); Rohrabaugh v. United States,
611 F.2d 211, 220 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
106 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (summarizing the three existing
rationales).
107 See Boyle, 105 S.Ct. at 691.
108 See id. at 692. ChiefJustice Burger stated that "[t]he time has come for a rule
with as 'bright' a line as can be drawn consistent with the statute and implementing
regulations." Id. (footnote omitted).
109 See id. at 693-94.
110 Id. at 690. The ChiefJustice maintained that because § 6651 of the Internal
Revenue Code was a revenue protection measure, the taxpayer must shoulder the
burden of proving that his failure to make a timely filing "was the result neither of
carelessness, reckless indifference, nor intentional failure." Id. at 690 n.4. Chief
Justice Burger reasoned that "our system of self-assessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply cannot work on any basis other than one of strict filing standards." Id. at 692. He asserted that "[p]rompt payment of taxes is imperative to the
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matter at issue in Boyle."' He refused to dwell on the factual similarities and differences in the conflicting cases, however. 1 2 Instead, the ChiefJustice declared that the time had come to clarify
the inconsistencies in prior decisions by establishing a "bright
line" rule for the filing of estate tax returns." 3 Chief Justice Burger reasoned that Congress had imposed the obligation of ascertaining and meeting the statutory deadline on the individual
taxpayer. 1"4 He stated that the taxpayer could not escape this
"unambiguous, precisely defined duty" by delegating it to a professional agent.' '5
Chief Justice Burger pointed out that Boyle was not a case in
which the taxpayer relied on the mistaken legal advice of a professional. 1 6 He approved the results of the "legal advice"
cases 117 and declared that a taxpayer could legitimately rely on
the advice of an accountant or an attorney when a question of
substantive tax law was at issue."18 The Chief Justice reasoned
that the majority of taxpayers were unable to detect inaccuracies
in the substantive advice offered by an experienced professional.' 9 He opined that a taxpayer should not be required to
challenge the expert's advice, seek a "second opinion," or
double check the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
20
himself. 1
The Chief Justice also stated, however, that a taxpayer did
not have to be an expert to know that an estate tax return would
government, which should not have to assume the burden of unnecessary ad hoc
determinations." Id. (footnote omitted).
'''
Id. at 691 & n.5.
112 Id. at 691-92.

113 Id. at 692.
114 See id. The Chief Justice stated: "Congress has placed the burden of prompt
filing on the executor, not on some agent or employee of the executor. The duty is
fixed and clear; Congress intended to place upon the taxpayer an obligation to
ascertain the statutory deadline and then to meet that deadline.
Id.
115 Id. at 692-93.
116 See id. at 693.
117 See id.
118 Id. Chief Justice Burger asserted that "[w]hen an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice." Id.

119 Id.

120 Id. The Chief Justice reasoned that this "would nullify the very purpose of
seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place." Id. The Court refused to
decide whether a taxpayer who relied on an expert's erroneous calculation of a tax
return's due date could establish reasonable cause for the resulting delinquent filing. See id. at 693 n.9.
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have some fixed deadline.' 2 ' He implied that an executor must
make a personal effort to ascertain the statutory deadline and ensure that the estate's tax obligations are met.' 22 Although he considered it common to rely on an attorney to perform these tasks,
ChiefJustice Burger stated that this reliance could not serve as a
substitute for the performance of a statutory duty. 23 The Chief
Justice concluded, therefore, that the taxpayer failed to demonstrate reasonable cause for the untimely filing of a Federal estate
tax return. 24 Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of
the Seventh Circuit. 125
Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the
Court's judgment. 26 He agreed with Chief Justice Burger that
taxpayers must ascertain and meet relevant tax deadlines.

2 7 Jus-

tice Brennan wrote separately, however, to emphasize that the
standard of "ordinary business care and prudence" applied only
to the "ordinary person."' 28 Justice Brennan pointed out that the
taxpayer in Boyle failed to demonstrate that he was unable to exercise ordinary business care because of some mental or physical
defect.' 2 9 Therefore, he agreed with the Court that the taxpayer
30
did not establish reasonable cause for the delinquent filing.1
Justice Brennan also observed that the "bright line" drawn
121
122

Id.

Id. at 693.
Id. ChiefJustice Burger stated:
Among the first duties of the representative of a decedent's estate is to
identify and assemble the assets of the decedent and to ascertain tax
obligations. Although it is common practice for an executor to engage a
professional to prepare and file an estate tax return, a person experienced in business matters can perform that task personally.

Id.
Id. at 693-94.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 694-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. Justice Brennan defined "ordinary person" as "one who is physically and
mentally capable of knowing, remembering, and complying with a filing deadline."
Id.
129 Id. The Court refused to decide whether a mentally or physically infirm taxpayer could demonstrate reasonable cause for the untimely filing of a return by
proving that he relied on an attorney. See id. at 692 n.6. Justice Brennan emphasized that mental or physical infirmity on the part of the taxpayer might justify a
finding of reasonable cause for late filing. Id. at 695 (Brennan,J., concurring). He
pointed out that "[miany executors are widows or widowers well along in years,
and a penalty against the 'estate' usually will be a penalty against their inheritance. . . .[E]xceptional cases necessarily will arise where taxpayers, by virtue of
senility, mental retardation, or other causes, are understandably unable to attain
society's norm." Id.
130 Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123
124
125
126
127
128
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by the majority did not clearly define the scope of taxpayer responsibility for untimely filing. '3 He reasoned that if Congress
had been determined to draw a "bright line," it would not have
provided for a "reasonable cause" exception to the statutory
penalty. 3 2 Although he stated that efficient tax collection was a
worthy goal, Justice Brennan concluded that efficiency must yield
33
to different values in appropriate situations.
In light of prior law, the Supreme Court's resolution of the
question presented in Boyle Was undoubtedly the correct one.
Congress has charged each taxpayer with the dual obligations of
ascertaining the relevant deadline and filing the required tax return prior to that deadline. 3 4 A taxpayer should not be able to
escape these obligations by delegating his duties to an agent and
then waiting passively while the agent handles the entire matter.' 3 5 The American "self-assessment" system of taxation would
indeed be adversely affected if taxpayers could escape their re36
sponsibilities so easily.1
The Court recognized, however, that a taxpayer may demonstrate reasonable cause for an untimely filing by showing that he
relied on professional advice concerning a question of substantive tax law. 13 7 This conclusion is correct. A taxpayer should not
be required to research the Internal Revenue Code in order to
determine whether his attorney's advice is accurate. 38 Reliance
on substantive legal advice must be deemed an exercise of ordinary business care and prudence. 3 9 Thus, the rationale of the
"legal advice" cases appropriately retains its vitality following the
Boyle decision. 4 0
131 See id.
132

Id.

133 Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 692.
135 See Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 204, 206 (1967) (refusing to allow taxpayer to "abdicate" his responsibility of filing an estate tax return
in a timely fashion), afd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969); cf. Haywood Lumber &
Mining Co., 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding in favor of taxpayer who did
not wait passively for his accountant to file the required return).
136 Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 692; see Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943).
137 See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (noting Court's approval of
"legal advice" cases).
138 Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693. As the court in United States v. Kroll noted, "[t]he
intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code with its sections, sub-sections, paragraphs
and sub-paragraphs, cross-references, etc. often require the tax expertise of the
most skilled, and on occasion, a soothsayer or attorney able to divine the ultimate
result in some appellate court." Kroll, 547 F.2d at 395.
1 ) See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693.
140 See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text (discussing "legal advice" cases).
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The Boyle Court expressly refused to decide two noteworthy
issues. The first of these was whether a mentally or physically
disabled taxpayer could demonstrate reasonable cause for an untimely filing by proving reliance on a professional agent.' 4 ' This
issue should be decided in favor of the taxpayer. A case of inability to exercise ordinary business care and prudence clearly requires a finding that reliance on an agent is reasonable cause for
an untimely filing. The Internal Revenue Service already recognizes that circumstances such as serious illness, unavoidable absence, and death in the family constitute reasonable cause for late
filing.' 4 2 These are all circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control.' 4 3 Inability to exercise ordinary business care and prudence
because of senility or disability is similarly beyond the taxpayer's
control.' 4 4 Therefore, a mentally or physically disabled taxpayer
who relies on an attorney to prepare and file a tax return should
not be penalized when the attorney fails to perform his duty
properly.
The second issue left open by the Boyle Court was whether
reliance on an agent's erroneous calculation of a tax return's due
date establishes reasonable cause for an untimely filing.' 4 5 This
question should also be decided in the taxpayer's favor. Taxpayer
reliance on an agent's erroneous calculation of a tax return's due
date is closely analogous to taxpayer reliance on an agent's mistaken legal advice.' 4 6 A taxpayer should not be penalized for reliance on a professional's incorrect determination of the due date
of a Federal estate tax return. Imposing a penalty in such a case
would force the taxpayer to double check his agent's calculation
by researching the relevant Code provisions himself.'4 7 This
141 See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 692 n.6; see also id. at 694-95 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that Court left this issue open).
142 See Audit Technique Handbook for Estate Tax Examiners, II INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (AUDIT) (CCH) § 4350, ch.(24)22.2(2)(d)-(e) (Mar. 20, 1980).
143 See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 692 n.6. In Boyle, ChiefJustice Burger noted that "[t]he
principle underlying the IRS regulations and practices [is] that a taxpayer should
not be penalized for circumstances beyond his control." Id.
144 See id. at 695 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
145 See id. at 693 n.9.
146 See supra note 103 (discussing Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 70 (1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975)). In Bradley (a "due date"
case), the tax court noted the close analogy to the "legal advice" cases. Bradley, 33
T.C.M. at 73.
147 See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693 (noting disapproval of situation in which taxpayer
would, in effect, be required to verify his attorney's legal research). Of course, different considerations might apply in the case of a Federal income tax return. See
Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 214. The Rohrabaugh majority noted that a Federal estate
tax return "has a floating due date keyed to the timing of the death of a particular
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would obviously defeat the purpose of employing an expert. 14 8
Fairness dictates that a taxpayer should be penalized only when
he delegates the preparation and filing of a tax return to an agent
and fails to verify that the return is filed in a timely manner.1 4 9
The Boyle case may also be viewed as an expression of the
Supreme Court's disapproval of irresponsible action by an attorney.' 50 In this type of case, the only remedy available to a taxpayer who is denied the defense of reasonable cause is a
malpractice action against his attorney for recovery of the late
52
filing penalty. 5 ' By rejecting the Seventh Circuit's rationale,
the Court appears unwilling to protect an obviously negligent
lawyer from such a malpractice suit.' 53 The Boyle decision should
therefore be regarded as one involving more than "protection of
the revenue." The Court was apparently also concerned with
on the person who caused the late
placing financial responsibility
1 54
attorney.
filing-the
Nonetheless, the lower Federal courts should not be insensidecedent." Id. By contrast, the court stated that "[a] taxpayer might have considerable difficulty in demonstrating an unawareness of the due date on an annual income tax return, if, for no other reason, because of the repeated media references
to the deadline date." Id.
148 See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693.
149 See id. at 692 (noting that taxpayer has statutory duty to ascertain relevant
filing deadline). When the taxpayer knows the filing deadline, the failure of his
agent to present the tax return for signature prior to that date puts the taxpayer on
notice that something is amiss. Kroll, 547 F.2d at 396. In such a case, reliance on
the agent after the deadline has passed "is not an exercise of ordinary business care
and prudence." Id. A taxpayer who demonstrates, however, that he acted quickly to
file the return soon after the deadline can make a substantial argument that he
disclaimed reliance on his delinquent agent. In such a situation, the taxpayer's reliance on the agent up to the due date should be deemed reasonable cause for the
late filing. Cf.Gray v. United States, 453 F.Supp. 1356, 1361 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (taxpayer has no duty to verify attorney's work until he acquires notice that attorney has
failed to perform his duties properly).
150 It is significant that Chief Justice Burger authored the majority opinion in
Boyle. The ChiefJustice has recently been outspoken in his criticism of incompetent
lawyers. See Burger, The State ofJustice, 70 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 64-65; Wiley &
Bodine, Question and Answer with the ChiefJustice, 71 A.B.A.J., Jan. 1985, at 91, 92, 94.
151 Several judges have noted that an attorney whose negligence causes the untimely filing of a tax return is subject to a malpractice action. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
152 See Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1254 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 687 (1985).
153 When a court refuses to impose the statutory penalty on the taxpayer, the
negligent attorney need not worry about a malpractice suit because the taxpayer
has not suffered an economic loss. See Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1256
(7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 687 (1985).
154 See id. at 1258 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that Boyle's attorney "was primarily responsible for depriving the Internal Revenue Service of its due").
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tive to the human factor in this type of case. The attorney responsible for the untimely filing of an estate tax return may be a
close friend or relative of the executor. 5 5 As a result, the taxpayer might be reluctant to pursue a malpractice action in order
to recover the statutory penalty. The innocent taxpayer would
therefore bear the economic loss alone. Furthermore, encouraging taxpayers to file malpractice actions against their attorneys
can lead to deterioration of the attorney-client relationship. 5 6
Consequently, as Justice Brennan concluded, this is one area of
the law in which efficiency should sometimes "yield to other
57
values." 1
Lawrence M. Czaplewski
155 See, e.g., Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1123 (7th Cir. 1981) (executor employed his cousin as attorney for the estate).
156 See Stewart, Supreme Court Report, 71 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1985, at 106, 108.
157 See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring).

